This article analyzes the extent to which the Appellate Body and WTO panels compare 
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of law firms that have important WTO practices conduct their work in English. However, as the importance of WTO law grows and expertise in WTO law spreads to firms that conduct their work in French or Spanish, more lawyers will consult the WTO legal texts in other languages than English. Discrepancies among the texts may failure to consider discrepancies as a possible source of a dispute can represent a significant obstacle to resolving a dispute through negotiation. 7 In addition to the potential for problems in the international arena, discrepancies between different authentic texts have implications in domestic legal systems. 8 Countries tend to adopt and implement treaties in their official languages. 9 Thus, for example, where there is a discrepancy between the English and Spanish texts, English-speaking and Spanish-speaking countries will adopt and implement different texts of the WTO agreements in question. This in turn can create a divergence in compliance with WTO norms by legislators or a divergence in the interpretation and application of WTO norms by administrative agencies and national courts. This examination reveals that the Appellate Body has only considered the three authentic texts in just over twenty-two percent of cases, even though Article 33 is material part of 7 This occurred in a dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which there was a discrepancy between the English and Russian texts regarding the right of innocent passage in Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages 1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32
does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.
The Appellate Body has taken the view that the customary rules of treaty interpretation reflected in Article 33 of the Vienna Convention requires the treaty interpreter to seek the meaning that gives effect, simultaneously, to all the terms of the treaty, as they are used in each authentic language, but also to make an effort to find a meaning that reconciles any apparent differences, taking into account the presumption that they have the same meaning in each authentic text. 16 Article 29. Interpretation of treaties in two or more languages 1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. Except in the case mentioned in paragraph 1, when a comparison of the texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 27 and 28 does not remove, a meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted. 19 Paragraph 1 refers to the languages in which the text of the treaty has been 'authenticated' rather than 'drawn up' or 'adopted', in order to take account of article 9 of the draft articles, in which the Commission recognized 'authentication of the text' as a distinct procedural step in the conclusion of a treaty. whether recourse should first be had to all or some of the normal means of interpretation in an attempt to reconcile the texts before concluding that there is a case of "divergence", since the jurisprudence was unclear on this point.
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The International Law Commission emphasized that the plurality of the authentic texts of a treaty is "always a material factor in its interpretation", but stressed that in law there is only one treaty accepted by the parties and one common intention even when two authentic texts appear to diverge. 21 The effect of the presumption in paragraph 33(3) is to entitle each party to use only one authentic text of a treaty at the outset. 22 Moreover, this presumption makes it unnecessary for tribunals to compare language texts on a routine basis; comparison is only necessary when there is an allegation of ambiguity or divergence among authentic texts, which rebuts the presumption. 23 A duty of routine comparison would imply the rejection of this presumption. 24 The practice of the Appellate Body and WTO panels supports the view that routine comparison is not necessary, as does the practice of many domestic courts and other international tribunals.
25
In practice, most plurilingual treaties contain some discrepancy between the texts.
Discrepancies in the meaning of the texts may be an additional source of ambiguity in the terms of the treaty. Alternatively, when the meaning of terms is ambiguous in one language, but clear in another, the plurilingual character of the treaty can facilitate interpretation. Because there is only one treaty, the presumption in paragraph 3 that the terms of a treaty are intended to have the same meaning in each authentic text "requires that every effort should be made to find a common meaning for the texts before preferring one to another". 26 Regardless of the source of the ambiguity, "the first rule for the interpreter is to look for the meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the term by applying the standard rules for the interpretation of treaties" in Vienna Convention
Articles 31 and 32. The interpreter can not just prefer one text to another.
27
In formulating paragraph 3 of the draft Article, the Commission rejected the idea of a general rule laying down a presumption in favour of restrictive interpretation in the case of an ambiguity in plurilingual texts 28 and rejected creating a legal presumption in favour of the language in which the treaty was drafted. 29 In doing so, the Commission rejected the approach taken by the Permanent Court in the Mawommatis Palestine
Concessions case.
30
The draft Article provided that, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, "a meaning which as far as possible reconciles the texts shall be adopted", whereas the final version of Article 33(4) provides that "the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted". Adding the criterion of object and purpose addresses the possibility of the treaty interpreter applying her own criterion in situations where there alternative meanings that reconcile the text.
31
Linderfalk argues that the process of harmonization in Article 33 must take place in a predetermined order. 32 First, the treaty interpreter must determine whether the difference in meaning can be removed through the application of Articles 31 and 32.
Second, if there is divergence in meaning, does one text prevail? This step does not apply to the WTO agreements, since there is no provision indicating that one text will prevail in the event of a discrepancy. Third, if there is divergence in meaning, "the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted". This step requires that the texts be reconciled, not the meanings. 33 This requires the treaty interpreter to consider alternative meanings and to choose the one which best 31 Linderfalk, above n 4, 364. In the LaGrand (Germany/US) Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) applied Article 33(4) to a divergence of text in Article 41 of the ICJ Statute ("doivent être prises" in French and "ought to be taken" in English). After recourse to Articles 31 and 32 did not remove the difference in meaning, the Court considered the object and purpose of the ICJ Statute to reach a conclusion that was in conformity with the travaux préparatoires of Article 41. The Court found that that 'the terms by which the extent of Costa Rica's right of free navigation has been defined, including in particular the term "comercio", must be understood to have the meaning they bear on each occasion on which the Treaty is to be applied, and not necessarily their original meaning.' Thus, the right of free navigation in question applied to the transport of persons as well as the transport of goods. See paras. 70-71. may be difficult to translate into another language. 37 Differences between legal systems and legal cultures further complicate the task of translating legal concepts. 38 Indeed, the further apart the language structures are and the further apart the legal systems are, the more difficult it will be to translate legal terms without altering the meaning. 39 In the case of the WTO, English, French and Spanish are not that far apart, relatively speaking.
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They use virtually identical alphabets and have a considerable amount of common vocabulary, much of which is based on Latin. In addition, each of the three languages has incorporated vocabulary from each other. While there are some differences in the structure of each language, these differences are relatively limited. Thus, it should be relatively easy to compare texts on a routine basis at the WTO.
III. AB JURISPRUDENCE APPLYING VIENNA CONVENTION ARTICLE 33
This section examines the Appellate Body reports in which one or more parties or the If the application of Article 33 is a material part of treaty interpretation when the treaty is authentic in more than one language, and reflects the customary rules of treaty interpretation, the failure to apply Article 33 in all cases could be considered inconsistent with at least the spirit of Article 3.2 of the DSU. 79 However, the presumption in Article 
IV. PANEL JURISPRUDENCE APPLYING ARTICLE 33
This section examines panel reports in which one or more parties or the panel compared the authentic texts of a WTO Agreement, in panel reports issued from 1999 to 2009.
84
The following review of these reports uses the year the panel report was circulated. 92 In two of these cases, the panel resolves an ambiguity in the Spanish text by referring to the English and French texts. 93 In one of these cases, the panel resolves an ambiguity in the French text by referring to the English and Spanish texts. 94 In two of these cases, the panel resolves an ambiguity in the English text by referring to the French text only. 95 In three cases, the panel has found the text to be ambiguous in all three authentic texts. 96 In three cases, panels have cited the Spanish and French texts of a provision for no apparent purpose. 97 In the majority of cases in which panels compare authentic texts, they do so without any explicit reference to Article 33. In contrast, when the Appellate Body compares texts, it cites Article 33 just over half of the time. Sometimes panels cite Article 33 as an applicable rule of treaty interpretation, but then do not go on to compare authentic texts. 98 In one case, a panel misapplied the presumption in Article 33(3) and cited the Appellate Body as authority for doing so; the panel interpreted Article 33(3) to require a harmonious interpretation where there was a divergence between the authentic texts. 99 In only one case did the panel explicitly apply Article 33(4) to resolve a divergence between the authentic texts. 100 In some cases, the parties use only one other text to support their interpretation of the English text, while in other cases they use both of the other texts. In one case, one party used the Spanish text to support its interpretation of the English text, while the other party used the French text to support the opposite interpretation of the same English text. 101 This variation in the practice of parties also occurs in the Appellate Body.
V. CONCLUSION
The experience to date in the WTO suggests that the plurilingual nature of the WTO Agreements does not make treaty interpretation significantly more difficult than it would be with a text authentic in one language only. Rather, the main issue in the WTO context is the lack of a consistent approach in the manner in which panels and the Appellate Body use the three authentic texts when interpreting WTO provisions. In addition, the Appellate Body often fails to distinguish between, or confuses, the different rules Commission.
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The presumption in paragraph 33(3) of the Vienna Convention means that there is no obligation to compare authentic texts on a routine basis. However, there is no obligation to avoid doing so either. A rule of mandatory comparison is probably impractical for most plurilingual treaties, due to a lack of multilingual legal personnel and 102 I thank Professor Gabriela Rodríguez for this observation. Regarding the effect on interpretation of Article 33, it is important to recall that subsequent practice should carry more weight than travaux préparatoires, since the former forms part of the general rule of treaty interpretation (Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(b)) whereas the latter is merely a supplementary means of treaty interpretation (Vienna Convention Article 32).
